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Abstract 
In this Work Project, I evaluate the relevance of the debate around fair value’s Level 
II and Level III assets and liabilities. The literature outlines some qualitative shortcomings 
of this valuation technique. However, it seems important to understand how those assets 
and liabilities affect the balance sheet from a quantitative point of view. The data collected 
indicate that 10% of the balance sheets of Standard & Poor’s 500 companies is evaluated 
using fair value measurement. My analysis reveals that the market prices are positively 
associated with fair value. It shows they are highly and positively sensible to Level III 
assets, suggesting that shortcomings outlined in the literature concerning the poor reliance 
in those inputs are not translated in the market behavior. The market even reacts in the 
opposite way as it approves the use of Level III inputs. 
 
Key Words: Fair Value; Level II; Level III; S&P 500.  
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I. Introduction  
The Valuation Research Corporation performed a survey in 2009 revealing that 58% 
of financial professionals believe the recent market crisis has negated fair value's validity.  
Fair value measurement has been a concern for both the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in recent years. 
The FASB published new regulation regarding those measurements in 2006, followed by 
the IASB in 2011. Those regulations have improved the concept of a three-level hierarchy 
to value assets and liabilities: when reporting an asset or a liability using fair value 
measurement, a company should use the best available market information. If possible, the 
company should use a Level I input which is the market price of the asset. When this 
information is not available, it should use Level II inputs, corresponding to proxies of the 
asset or liability. In case of illiquid market, the company should use Level III inputs that are 
models developed to value the asset or the liability.  
Many analysts believe fair value, and especially Level II and Level III assets 
measurement, have shown some limitations during the recent market crisis. Those 
criticisms are based on qualitative shortcomings of fair value. However, there are some 
unanswered questions, such as: are those criticisms relevant in practice? Are Level II and 
Level III assets significant in balance sheets of companies? In which proportion are those 
assets used, when compared to total fair value measurement? How does the market react to 
the use of fair value in the balance sheet of companies? 
This Work Project focuses on those issues by analyzing the assets and liabilities 
which are measured at fair value, as well as the proportion of Level II and Level III assets 
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and liabilities. The initial sample consists of the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) 
companies, as defined on the 31st December 2013. Some of the S&P500 companies do not 
disclose fair value in their annual report, without any specific reasons. That way, the final 
sample includes 434 companies.  
To determine whether the criticisms in the literature around Level II and Level III 
assets and liabilities are justified, I perform an analysis in two parts: first, I establish a ratio 
analysis in order to determine in which proportion fair value is used in the balance sheet 
and what proportion Level II and Level III represent within fair value measurement. Second, 
I run a regression based on the Ohlson model (Ohlson, 1995) to assess the impact that each 
level of fair value has on the share price. To do so, I determine 5 variables: NONFV, 
corresponding to the value of assets, minus the value of liabilities and minus fair value 
measurement; LEVEL I, LEVEL II and LEVEL III variables, representing assets and 
liabilities measured at fair value using respectively Level I, Level II and Level III inputs 
and finally EPS. Those variables are scaled on a per share basis to keep consistency.  
To validate criticisms found in the literature, I expect from this ratio analysis a high 
proportion of fair value measurement and especially of Level II and Level III assets and 
liabilities in the balance sheet. From my model, I also expect for variables LEVEL I, 
LEVEL II and LEVEL III to have a negative effect on the share price in order to outline 
that the market punishes the use of fair value. 
The data indicates that fair value has a significant impact on the balance sheet with a 
mean of 10% of fair value measurement in total assets and liabilities. This impact tends to 
increase for the financial and technological industries, approaching 20%. Results from the 
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estimation of my model show the share price is positively influenced by all the variables 
and especially by the LEVEL III and EPS variables. For an increase of $1 of LEVEL III, 
the share price should increase three times more. This increase is even greater for EPS, 
which has an impact of 6x on the share price.  
The research performed in this Work Project might be the proof that the market 
does not punish fair value. The reason for the gap that exists between the literature and the 
quantitative analysis might be the fact that companies which suffered from misvaluations of 
fair value (Herring, 2011) during the crisis have improved and strengthened their models. 
That way, valuation techniques might have become more reliable, which has already been 
perceived by the market.  
II. Literature review 
In 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) published a new 
statement concerning fair value measurement, named FASB Concept N°157, Fair Value 
Measurements. In 2011, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued very 
similar guidelines on the same topic in IFRS 13, Fair Value Measurements. After the 
financial crisis of 2008, the principle of fair value, as defined in those statements, was 
highly challenged by many investors, regulators and financial professionals for many 
reasons (Anonymous, 2009, Enahoro and Jayeoba, 2013, Herring, 2011).  
The statements of the FASB and the IASB both define fair value as "the price that 
would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction 
between market participants at the measurement date", which means fair value is based on 
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the exit price of an asset or a liability (FASB, 2006, IASB, 2011). This definition translates 
an incentive to evaluate assets and liabilities based on their market price, from a market 
perspective, and not based on their historical price (Power, 2010).  
To determine the value of an asset or a liability, both FASB and IASB separate fair 
value inputs in a three-level hierarchy, depending on available market information. Level I 
inputs are used when a quoted price in observable and active market can be found for an 
identical asset or liability. When it is impossible to determine a price for an identical asset 
or a liability due to an illiquid market or a small number of transactions of this asset or 
liability, Level II inputs are required. It uses other inputs in observable market than quoted 
prices for an identical asset or liability, such as similar assets’ market prices. If an asset or a 
liability is sold in an unobservable and inactive market, its value is determined with Level 
III inputs: models that use the best information available, including all risks related to the 
asset or liability. 
After the recent market crisis, fair value measurement, especially when using Level 
II and Level III inputs, was highly criticized for many reasons, mainly because of the lack 
of reliability of those valuation techniques (Chea, 2011, Herring, 2011). In times of crisis, 
the liquidity in financial market disappears, which leads to the difficulty of valuing 
products, since Level I inputs are not available anymore. It is then required to switch from 
the mark-to-market to the mark-to-model perspective (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2008). However, companies, and more particularly banking institutions, are 
not prepared to deal with those valuations techniques (Basel Committee on Banking 
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Supervision, 2008). That way, the valuation is often incorrect. Many reasons for this 
misvaluation were found in the literature, as discussed next.  
First, companies are not prepared to value financial instruments with mark-to-model 
techniques. They use proxies that are not always accurate, such as primary market prices, 
generic credit spreads based on ratings or prices for similar transactions (Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2008). Second, in the last century, very complex products were 
developed. Those products turned out to be difficult to value accurately (Vinals, 2008). 
This has been the case with structured obligations (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2008) or with products such as convertible callable bonds, for which banks 
cannot determine which component should be evaluate first - the callable or the convertible 
feature of the bond (Landsman, 2007). 
Determining all the risks related to a product is very challenging, especially when a 
firm is not prepared to deal with illiquid markets, as seen in the recent market stress. 
Bankers tend to focus mainly on credit risk and forget to embed all market risks (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008, Vinals, 2008). Even when products are well 
understood, another issue occurs: the model used to value the asset or liability appears to be 
very complex and therefore difficult to implement (Cascini and  DelFavero, 2011, Ferguson, 
2008, Landsman, 2007). Another dimension is that financial instruments are often 
interdependent; this makes the valuation of products, in case of illiquid markets, almost 
unworkable (Landsman, 2007). 
Many critics deplore that those valuation techniques leave room for management 
bias. To improve relevance, companies often include management’s opinion while valuing 
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the company (Landsman, 2007). However, it is often said that managers have too many 
incentives to become dishonest regarding the value of particular assets or liabilities, which 
can lead to moral hazard problems (Herring, 2011, Laux and Leuz, 2009). As managers are 
often rewarded based on future estimations or previous results, they could be tempted to 
overstate the value of assets and to manipulate information for personal purpose (Barbera 
and Fornaro, 2007, Ferguson, 2008, Penman, 2007). This behavior could lead to in less 
reliable and subjective valuations (Chea, 2011). Another concern is that those 
misvaluations could result in an adverse selection process. Given those incorrect valuations, 
an investor might have the impression that two products are equivalent, while one is better 
than the other, and therefore, the investor could make a different choice than the one he 
would have made knowing the true value of both products (Emerson et al., 2010, Landsman, 
2007, Prochazka, 2011). To emphasize this aspect, some outline the difficulty for auditors 
to verify models and assumptions provided by managers (Barbera and Fornaro, 2007, 
Ferguson, 2007, Martin et al., 2006), as models become very complex (Chea, 2011).  
Even assuming that managers are honest, these tend to be too optimistic concerning 
the future of their company (Kolev, 2009, Penman, 2007) and measurement errors are not 
avoidable (Barbera and Fornaro, 2007, Penman, 2007, Prochazka, 2011). This results in 
inappropriate valuations, increases the volatility in financial statements and affects the 
information provided to investors (Landsman, 2007). 
As a solution, proponents of fair value claim management should improve the 
disclosures concerning their assumptions, models and inputs (Chea, 2011, Prochazka, 2011, 
Vinals, 2008) in order to facilitate the work of auditors and to give the opportunity to 
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investors to understand the mechanism used to valuate Level II and Level III assets. It is 
also necessary to set limits to the power given to management in order to improve the 
information and reduce the incentives they may have to manipulate the data (Landsman, 
2007, Laux and Leuz, 2009). 
This debate leads to the following questions: how important are Level II and Level 
III assets, when compared to the total value of an enterprise? Is it relevant to question fair 
value based on the argument that Level II and Level III assets might reduce the quality of 
information due to misvaluations? A survey from the SEC (2008) revealed that the banking 
industry evaluates less than 50% of assets at fair value. How much of those assets are 
valued using Level II and Level III inputs? In this Work Project, I try to answer these 
questions. Additionally, I analyze how capital markets incorporate the values of Level II 
and Level III assets in their valuation of firms’ stock. 
III. Methodology  
The objective of this Work Project is to define whether the criticism around fair 
value accounting and, in particular, Level II and Level III assets is relevant. To answer this 
question, I use two methods: (i) a ratio analysis of fair value assets and liabilities; (ii) a 
regression analysis to test how the market prices firms’ Level II and Level III assets and 
liabilities.  
Ratio analysis  
In this section, I evaluate the weight of Level II and Level III assets and liabilities in 
the balance sheet of companies. As this information is not directly mentioned in the balance 
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sheet, I need to hand collect it directly from the notes of the published financial statements, 
in annual reports.  
With collected data, I calculate the following ratios: 
(1) Fair Value to Balance Sheet ratio: !!
Total Fair Value Assets and Liabilities! 
Total Assets and Liabilities!
!
!!!  ; 
(2) Level II and III to Balance Sheet ratio:  !!
Total Level II and Level III Assets and Liabilities! 
Total Assets and Liabilities!
!
!!!  ; 
(3) Level II and III to Fair Value ratio: !!
Total Level II and Level III Assets and Liabilities! 
Total Fair Value Assets and Liabilities!
!
!!! ; 
(4) Level III to Fair Value ratio: !!
Total Level III Assets and Liabilities! 
Total Fair Value Assets and Liabilities!
!
!!! . ∀  𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁. 
These ratios aim at measuring the weight of fair value measurement on the balance 
sheet and determining whether the Level II and Level III assets and liabilities represent a 
large share of the values on both the total assets and liabilities and the total fair value 
measurement. More precisely, Fair Value to Balance Sheet ratio evaluates the impact of fair 
value accounting on the total assets and liabilities; Level II and III to Balance Sheet ratio 
measures the effect Level II and Level III assets and liabilities have on the total assets and 
liabilities. I complete this information with details about the proportion of Level II and 
Level III assets and liabilities in the total fair value measurement (ratios 3 and 4). Even if 
results reveal a low value of ratio 2 (Level II and III to Balance Sheet), criticism would still 
be relevant in the cases where high values are found for the Level II and III to Fair Value 
ratio and Level III to Fair Value ratio.  
Given that these ratios may change substantially across different industries, I 
perform tests which compare the global mean and median from, respectively, each industry 
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mean and median. That way, the objective is to understand whether the industries have an 
impact on fair value measurement.  
Regression 
In the second part of my Work Project, I create a multivariate model in order to 
assess the way capital markets price the use of Level II and Level III assets and liabilities 
valuation. This model is based on Ohlson (Ohlson, 1995, Ohlson and Feltham, 1995), as 
this author specifies the market value of a firm depends on its book value of equity and on 
its earnings given that these substitute for future dividends, according to the clean surplus 
equation. On a stock price basis, it depends on book value of equity per share, or assets 
minus liabilities per share and on earnings-per-share. To perform my analysis, I adapt this 
model by incorporating fair value measurement, as follows:  
(1)  Share price = α + βNONFV + γ1LEVEL I + γ2LEVEL II + γ3LEVEL III + δEPS                                 
In this model, the variable NONFV is calculated by adding assets, subtracting 
liabilities and subtracting assets and liabilities evaluated at fair value. Following other 
papers implementing the Ohlson model (Dechow et al., 1999, Spilioti, 2010), the book 
value of equity should be worth 1. However, I adapt this model by subtracting fair value 
measurement which is the reason why I expect the estimated coefficient to have a value 
slightly above 1. The next three variables reflect the use of fair value. They correspond to 
the amount of assets and liabilities measured at each level of fair value. In order to be 
consistent with the Ohlson model, the sum of the variables NONFV, LEVEL I, LEVEL II 
and LEVEL III should be equal to 1. That way, as I expect NONFV to be greater than 1, I 
also expect LEVEL I, LEVEL II and LEVEL III to be greater than 1. However, in order to 
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be consistent with the literature, I could expect LEVEL II and LEVEL III variables to be 
smaller than 1 in order to reflect the fact that the market does not rely on those valuation 
techniques. This could also be reflected in the parameters: γ1>γ2>γ3. Finally, EPS, which 
reflects the future dividends, should have a much larger value than the other parameters as 
it expresses the net income available for shareholders in the future. Comparing the values 
of the different gammas allows me to determine how capital markets price the use of each 
level of those assets and liabilities measured at fair value in their valuation of firms’ prices.  
In order to assess the impact fair value measurement can have on the share price of 
a company, I use share prices and earnings-per-shares of each company three months after 
the closing date of their financial report. This delay represents the time required to publish 
financial statements and, afterwards, to affect share prices and earnings-per-shares. 
To incorporate fair value measurement in this regression, I have to adapt the Ohlson 
model. However, it is not clear how this adaptation affects the model. That way, I compare 
the results of my multivariate model with the ones of two other regressions: a regression 
following the Ohlson model and a regression without incorporating the EPS variable. Those 
two comparisons challenge the robustness of my model, as it has already been done in 
previous papers using Ohlson model (Spilioti, 2010). 
As the fair value factors are composed of both assets and liabilities measured at fair 
value, there is an approximation in the variable NONFV. Indeed, this component should 
add fair value of assets and subtract fair value of liabilities. However, as the disclosure of 
fair value measurement is not subject to a precise regulation, companies often disclose a 
total amount of fair value measurement without specifying the proportion of assets and 
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liabilities. Therefore, fair value of assets and liabilities are summed instead of substracted, 
which leads to a minor approximation in this regression. 
IV. Sample 
I concentrate my study on S&P500 companies listed on the 31st of December 2013, 
as the FASB set up regulation concerning fair value measurement earlier than the IASB. 
For each S&P 500 company, I read fair value disclosures in published 10-K form or annual 
report in 2012, as 2013's 10-K forms are not published yet when I begin to collect data. I 
collect the following information: I select the value of assets and liabilities that are 
measured at fair value on a recurring basis, as well as the total assets value for each 
company. From Bloomberg, I collect the companies' industry (Basics Materials, 
Communications, Consumers Cyclical, Consumers Non Cyclical, Energy, Financial, 
Industrial, Technology, Utilities). 
To perform my analysis, there is a need to separate firms that effectively disclose 
fair value measurement in 2012 (86,8%) from the ones that do not disclose it (13,2%), as in 
Panel A of Table 1. For the 434 companies that disclose fair value measurement among the 
500 S&P500 companies, I classify each of them in its particular industry according to the 
Bloomberg classification. This results in the following division: 22 Basics Materials 
companies, 35 Communications companies, 56 Consumers Cyclical companies, 84 
Consumers Non-cyclical companies, 1 Diversified company, 40 Energy companies, 72 
Financial companies, 54 Industrial companies, 42 Technology companies and 28 Utilities 
companies, as mentioned in Panel B of Table 1. As analyzing one single company within 
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the diversified industry is meaningless, I decide not to take it into account in the following 
analysis. Furthermore, the value of earnings-per-share is not available for three companies. 
This leaves the final sample of the regression with 430 companies, as in Panel C of Table 1. 
V. Results 
This section is divided in two parts: (i) the ratio analysis; (ii) the regression analysis. 
These analyses are complementary: while the ratio analysis is focused on specific items of 
the balance sheet and does not control for other variables, the regression analysis studies 
the association between our variables of interest and stock prices; considering other 
relevant relations allowing me to understand the overall dynamic of share prices. 
Ratio analysis 
The values of the four ratios defined above are presented in Table 2.  
The results for the Fair Value to Balance Sheet ratio are mentioned in Panel A. 
These indicate that the S&P500 companies evaluate 10.08% of their total assets and 
liabilities at fair value. This value is statistically different from 0 meaning that fair value 
has a significant influence on the total assets and liabilities. Some industries disclose a 
higher rate of fair value usage in the total of assets and liabilities, such as the financial and 
technological industries with respectively 20.6% and 17.25%. The energy and utilities 
industries have the lowest disclosure with respectively 3.82% and 3.33%. Two thirds of the 
industries show a p-value for a t-test on mean lower than 1%, meaning their mean is 
significantly different from the global mean. Thus, there is a significant level of variation 
across industries. The reason for the high proportion of fair value measurement in the 
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balance sheet of the financial industry comes from a high level of financial instruments in 
this industry (Nissim and Penman, 2007), due to their business. In the technological 
industry, licenses and patents appear to be a significant part of fair value measurement 
(KPMG, 2010). The median of this ratio reveals that half of the S&P companies disclose 
less than 4.29% of their assets and liabilities using fair value. Once again, the financial and 
technological industries have higher values, with half of the companies in these industries 
disclosing respectively more than 15.8% and 16.87% of their assets and liabilities using fair 
value.  
The Level II and III to Balance Sheet ratio shows S&P500 companies incorporate 
7.01%, of total assets and liabilities using Level II and Level III assets and liabilities 
valuation (Panel B of Table 2). The financial and technological industries have higher 
values with, respectively, 16.2% and 11.68%, which is consistent with the Fair Value to 
Balance Sheet ratio's results. It shows those industries disclose a significant percentage of 
their assets and liabilities using fair value measurement. Once again, this is mainly due to 
their activities, as mentioned in previous paragraph. The median of this ratio shows that 
half of S&P 500 companies only disclose 1.68% of their balance sheet using Level II and 
Level III inputs. Once again, the financial and technological industries present a higher rate 
of disclosure with a median of, respectively, 10.39% and 9.73%. 
The Level II and III to Fair Value ratio  indicates in Panel C of Table 2 that 63.76% 
of the assets and liabilities measured at fair value require Level II and Level III inputs. The 
financial industry is the only industry with a mean value which is significantly different 
from the overall mean in the case of this ratio (p-value of 0.97). The value of the median 
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reveals however that half of the S&P500 companies disclose more than 71.4% of fair value 
using Level II and Level III inputs, increasing to 87.95% for the financial industry. The 
means and medians of this ratio indicate that fair value measurement depends mostly on 
Level II and Level III inputs. Thus, concerns about subjectivity in these levels are 
warranted, as they may impact the value of the firms. 
The Level III to Fair Value ratio, analyzing the proportion of Level III assets and 
liabilities in total fair value measurement, reveals that only 8.31% of fair value 
measurement require Level III inputs (Panel D of Table 2). This ratio tends to be larger for 
the consumers non-cyclical industry (12.71%) and much smaller for the technological 
industry (1.77%), with a p-value for the t-test on mean of 0.00. The median of this ratio 
outlines that half of the companies disclose less than 0.31% of fair value using Level III 
inputs. This small disclosure of Level III assets and liabilities in the technological industry 
reveals that, even though it shows a large Fair Value to Balance Sheet ratio, it is not 
affected by the criticism around Level II and more particularly Level III assets and 
liabilities. The fact that the financial industry does not show a large Level III to Fair Value 
ratio although it presents a high Level II and Level III to Balance sheet ratio also outlines 
that it discloses the majority of fair value using Level II inputs. 
This analysis reveals the fact that the S&P500 companies' balance sheets could be 
affected by fair value measurements’ errors as fair value has a significant impact on it. 
Some industries such as the technological and financial industries are much more exposed 
to the risk of fair value mismeasurements’ errors as those present a higher proportion of fair 
value in their balance sheet.  
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Even if the use of fair value is not homogeneous through the industries as the means 
and medians of the ratios are very different depending on the industries, Levels inputs used 
within fair value tend to be constant among industries given the Level II and Level III to 
fair value ratio. Critics outline that fair value accounting is not relevant and reliable enough 
due to misvaluations of Level II and more specifically Level III assets and liabilities. From 
those results, critics should differentiate problems arisen from Level II inputs and problems 
arisen from Level III inputs as their impacts are of different magnitude on global fair value 
measurement.  
Regression 
Results of my multivariate model can be found in Table  3 Panel A: Model A:  
Share price = 26.43 + 1.21 NONFV + 1.18 LEVEL I + 1.00 LEVEL II + 3.38                  
LEVEL III + 6.34 EPS 
The estimated coefficient of the variable NONFV reveals that it affects significantly 
(p-value of 0.00) and positively the share price of a company. A coefficient of 1.21 means 
the share price will increase by $1.21 for each increase of $1 of NONFV. This regression 
also outlines that the share price is positively and significantly affected by LEVEL I, 
LEVEL II and LEVEL III with, respectively, coefficients of 1.18, 1.00 and 3.38. While the 
coefficients of NONFV, LEVEL I and LEVEL II correspond to the expected results, the 
coefficient of LEVEL III is more surprising: it suggests that the share price of a company 
increases by three dollars when LEVEL III increases by one dollar. The last parameter of 
the regression is the EPS which affects positively and significantly the share price of a 
company, with a coefficient of 6.34.  
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It is also interesting to test the robustness of this model by performing other 
regressions: without incorporating the EPS parameter or following the Ohlson model, the 
regressions present similar results (Table 3, Panel B: Model B, Panel C: Model C) than the 
original regression, with significant variables. This confirms the results found in my model 
as each parameter affects positively and significantly the share price with, once again, a 
greater impact of LEVEL III and EPS.  
From those regressions, I can conclude that the market price of a firm is positively 
influenced by each variable. However, it is important to note that LEVEL III and EPS 
variables influence much more the stock price. This result has to be confronted with the 
ratio analysis and the ideas provided by the literature.  
V. Conclusion 
The objective of this Work Project was to determine whether the qualitative critics 
around fair value, and around Level II and Level III assets and liabilities in particular, were 
fortified from a quantitative point of view. From those analyses, I can conclude that the 
qualitative critics around fair value are not validated by the quantitative analysis. Two 
points should be remembered from this Work Project. First, the literature should 
differentiate drawbacks arising from Level II of those coming from Level III valuations as 
those are not disclosed in the same proportions. Second, the difference between qualitative 
and quantitative analyses could come from the evolution of fair value. After the crisis, 
companies suffered from wrong models and from misvaluations. My results suggest that 
capital markets perceived a change in fair value measurement, as share price is positively 
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influenced by Levels inputs and more especially by Level III inputs. As it trusts fair value 
measurement, a possible reason might be that companies learned their lesson and 
implement new models, more reliable and less subjective in order to avoid another turmoil 
due to those mistakes. That way, the literature might reveal problems present during the 
crisis and without assessing the changes companies implement during those last years to 
strengthen their fair value measurements. The results of this Work Project show that the 
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Table 1: Sample 
 Panel A: Sample   
Companies disclosing Fair Value Measurement 434 
Companies not disclosing Fair Value Measurement 66 
Total 500 
  Panel B: Industries for the ratio analysis   
Industry Observations 
Global 434 
Basics material 22 
Communications 35 
Consumers, Cyclical 56 








Panel C: Industries for the regression   
Industry Observations 
Global 430 
Basics material 22 
Communications 34 
Consumers, Cyclical 56 










Ratio analysis of Fair Value Accounting in S&P500 companies' balance sheet 
      Panel A: Fair Value on Total Balance Sheet ratio 











Global 10,08% N/A 4,29% N/A 13,65% 
Basics material 5,61% 0,61% 2,79% 11,93% 6,43% 
Communications 10,24% 93,20% 6,70% 9,44% 10,76% 
Consumers, Cyclical 4,31% 0,00% 1,85% 0,43% 6,31% 
Consumers, Non-Cyclical 9,09% 50,37% 4,65% 9,22% 12,01% 
Energy 3,82% 0,00% 1,21% 0,01% 7,37% 
Financial 20,60% 0,00% 15,80% 0,01% 0,00% 
Industrial 7,56% 27,92% 1,26% 0,43% 16,23% 
Technology 17,25% 0,01% 16,87% 0,01% 10,16% 
Utilities 3,33% 0,00% 2,35% 1,01% 3,04% 
      












Global 7,01% N/A 1,68% N/A 11,77% 
Basics material 3,03% 0,47% 0,26% 1,63% 5,55% 
Communications 5,40% 26,80% 1,04% 9,66% 7,86% 
Consumers, Cyclical 1,89% 0,00% 0,47% 0,43% 3,55% 
Consumers, Non-Cyclical 6,09% 43,73% 2,14% 8,47% 9,58% 
Energy 3,08% 0,09% 0,49% 0,40% 6,24% 
Financial 16,20% 0,00% 10,39% 0,01% 16,80% 
Industrial 6,12% 68,99% 0,64% 0,81% 15,82% 
Technology 11,68% 0,44% 9,73% 0,01% 9,48% 
Utilities 2,04% 0,00% 1,26% 14,32% 2,02% 
        
 23 












Global 63,76% N/A 71,40% N/A 33,89% 
Basics material 54,12% 28,98% 64,72% 15,73% 41,00% 
Communications 49,20% 2,76% 49,49% 4,15% 36,41% 
Consumers, Cyclical 57,45% 22,51% 64,28% 5,97% 36,63% 
Consumers, Non-Cyclical 68,13% 25,89% 75,74% 8,47% 31,95% 
Energy 64,37% 92,07% 80,76% 8,09% 36,60% 
Financial 74,11% 0,97% 87,95% 0,08% 30,31% 
Industrial 65,69% 70,30% 71,85% 11,46% 35,05% 
Technology 61,15% 60,02% 62,89% 3,53% 30,32% 
Utilities 63,58% 96,88% 64,00% 7,92% 22,87% 
      Panel D: Level III on Total Fair Value ratio 











Global 8,31% N/A 0,31%    17,61% 
Basics material 9,37% 77,58% 1,10% 15,73% 16,75% 
Communications 8,63% 91,27% 0,00% 6,74% 16,41% 
Consumers, Cyclical 6,97% 54,42% 0,00% 0,86% 15,31% 
Consumers, Non-Cyclical 12,71% 9,74% 0,79% 6,04% 22,80% 
Energy 7,76% 85,94% 0,00% 8,09% 19,01% 
Financial 8,15% 93,64% 2,82% 0,01% 15,67% 
Industrial 7,27% 72,38% 0,00% 0,01% 20,77% 
Technology 1,77% 0,00% 0,00% 3,53% 7,69% 





    
Panel A: Model 1    
  Coefficients t Stat p-level 
Intercept 26,43 6,26 0,00 
NONFV 1,21 8,32 0,00 
LEVEL I 1,18 8,13 0,00 
LEVEL II 1,00 6,76 0,00 
LEVEL III 3,38 6,56 0,00 
EPS 6,34 2,88 0,00 
Regression Statistics       
Adjusted R Square   22% 
Total Number Of Cases   430 
    
Panel B: Model 2    
  Coefficients t Stat p-level 
Intercept 30,84 7,79 0,00 
NONFV 1,28 8,81 0,00 
LEVEL I 1,26 8,77 0,00 
LEVEL II 1,07 7,24 0,00 
LEVEL III 3,42 6,61 0,00 
Regression Statistics       
Adjusted R Square   21% 
Total Number Of Cases   430 
    
Panel C: Model 3    
  Coefficients t Stat p-level 
Intercept 28,03 6,79 0,00 
BVE  1,09 8,54 0,00 
EPS 5,97 2,65 0,01 
Regression Statistics       
Adjusted R Square   18% 
Total Number Of Cases   430 
 
